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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
This case presents the question of whether and under what 
circumstances a misrepresentation renders a grievance process 
“unavailable” within the meaning of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  We conclude 
that the District Court erred in finding that the second step of 
the grievance process here was available to the plaintiff, Steven 
Patrick Hardy, even though a prison counselor misled him into 
believing that after his grievance was rejected he should file a 
new one rather than appeal the rejection.  Because that 
misrepresentation thwarted Hardy’s use of the grievance 
process, we find that he exhausted his available administrative 
remedies.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment and remand for further 
proceedings.   
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 
Steven Patrick Hardy entered the Camp Hill State 
Correctional Institute (“Camp Hill”) in July 2017 in urgent 
 
1 “Although the availability of administrative remedies to a 
prisoner is a question of law . . . it necessarily involves a factual 
inquiry,” Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 
2013) (internal citations omitted).  “[J]udges may resolve 
factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without the 
participation of a jury” as long as the parties are given “some 
form of notice” and “an opportunity to respond.”  Paladino v. 
Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 210, 211 (3d Cir. 2018).  Here, the 
District Court elected to hold an evidentiary hearing to address 
the threshold exhaustion question.  The parties do not dispute 
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need of medical care: he had previously had part of his leg 
amputated due to diabetes and had developed an infected open 
wound as a result of an ill-fitting prosthesis.  Typically, 
inmates entering Camp Hill were transferred immediately to a 
prison block, where they were given a copy of a Camp Hill 
inmate handbook explaining, among other things, the inmate 
grievance process, where grievance forms could be obtained, 
and that the grievance process required inmates to appeal 
rejected grievances.   But Hardy’s first days at Camp Hill were 
not typical.  Because of his physical ailments, he was brought 
immediately to the infirmary and remained there for his first 
week at Camp Hill.  And because he was not allowed personal 
belongings in the infirmary, he was not given the inmate 
handbook but rather was told it would be waiting for him in his 
prison block.  Relying on this assurance, Hardy signed a form 
acknowledging receipt of the handbook despite not yet having 
laid eyes on it.   
When Hardy arrived at his block, however, the handbook 
was not there.  And Hardy’s ensuing efforts to obtain the 
 
that they were given the proper notice and opportunity to 
respond.   
This background is adopted from the undisputed evidence 
submitted to the District Court in advance of its hearing, the 
live testimony credited by the District Court, and the District 
Court’s findings of fact in its opinion.  See Hardy v. Shaikh, 
No. 1:18-CV-1707, 2019 WL 1756535 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 
2019).  As required on review of summary judgment, we draw 
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.  
Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).     
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handbook or a copy of the Inmate Grievance System Policy 
manual (“grievance manual”)—the official policy document 
issued to Pennsylvania Department of Corrections staff—were 
unavailing.  When he asked prison staff in his assigned block 
for a handbook, he was told that he “should have already gotten 
one” and that obtaining one now was “[his] problem.”  App. 
179.  Hardy also tried twice to go to the Camp Hill library, 
which prison officials stated was “the best place to get [a copy 
of the grievance manual].”  App. 166:1–2.  But on both 
occasions, he was told the library was full.     
Consequently, while Hardy was aware that a grievance 
process existed at Camp Hill, he did not know that at Camp 
Hill, like other Pennsylvania state prisons, exhausting that 
grievance process requires inmates to complete three steps.  
Inmates must first submit a written grievance to the Facility 
Grievance Coordinator and must then file two levels of 
appeals:  first to the Facility Manager and then to the 
Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals.   
As Hardy’s leg wound festered, he complained to medical 
staff about his deteriorating condition and was advised to file a 
grievance.  That much was sound advice, as it directed Hardy 
to begin the internal process required to exhaust the prison 
grievance procedure.   
Consistent with the first step of that process, Hardy filed a 
grievance explaining that a particular medical provider at 
Camp Hill had refused to give him bandages and antibiotic 
ointment for his wound.  This grievance was rejected on 
procedural grounds because it was not “legible, 
understandable, and presented in a courteous manner.”  App. 
74.  Hardy then submitted a more courteous grievance 
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concerning the same incident.  Although this grievance 
received a review on the merits by Camp Hill’s nurse 
supervisor, it too was rejected—this time because the reviewer 
lacked “any information that there were any issues not 
addressed during [Hardy’s] sick call visit.”  App. 77.   
Hardy then filed a grievance responsive to this rejection.  
Now, instead of discussing only a single incident during which 
he alleged to have been denied proper medical care, his 
allegations provided a much fuller picture of how the medical 
staff’s failure to properly treat his leg wound in the months 
since his arrival at Camp Hill—including declining to follow a 
doctor’s recommendation to transfer him to an offsite medical 
facility for treatment—had caused his wound to deteriorate.  
He also explained how his fear that more of his leg would need 
to be amputated was causing him mental distress and that his 
request for mental health treatment had been denied.   
Although the grievance process normally required 
grievances to be filed within fifteen days of any incident and 
Hardy discussed conduct from months ago, his grievance was 
not “precluded solely by the fact that [these ongoing issues] 
started outside” the normal fifteen-day time limit because it 
described a continual pattern of conduct.  App. 177.  But it was 
rejected for a different reason:  The grievance process required 
“different events [to] be presented separately” and Camp Hill’s 
grievance coordinator (the prison staffer responsible for 
reviewing and processing grievances) apparently read this rule 
to require separate grievances for mental and physical harms.  
App. 80.  
Unsure of how next to proceed, Hardy again turned to 
prison staff for advice, asking his counselor, the prison staffer 
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assigned to provide him support and guidance about the 
grievance process, how he should respond to the grievance 
rejections.  His counselor told him to “fill out another one and 
send it in.”2  App. 187.  This time, the advice Hardy received 
from prison staff was not sound, for merely submitting a new 
grievance would not satisfy the appeal requirement.  Instead, 
Hardy could only have effectuated an appeal using the 
grievance form by writing the word “appeal” somewhere on 
his new grievance.   
Unaware of this requirement—and doing his best to 
interpret the rule that “different events . . . be presented 
separately,” App. 80—Hardy submitted eight new grievances, 
this time subdividing the pattern of conduct he described in his 
third grievance into separate grievances by date.  But these 
grievances too were rejected, this time largely due to yet 
another procedural requirement: now that Hardy had separated 
his allegations by date rather than discussing a continual 
pattern of conduct, his grievances were rejected as time 
barred.3  Several weeks later, Hardy submitted one last 
grievance and finally received a review on the merits.  This 
grievance too was rejected, with the reviewer finding Hardy’s 
 
2 Although the record is unclear as to when exactly this 
conversation took place, the timing of Hardy’s various 
grievances and rejections suggests he must have received this 
advice after his third grievance was rejected.  
3 Of these eight grievances, six were rejected as time-
barred; one was rejected for discussing both mental and 
physical harms; and another was rejected for discussing the 
same incident as Hardy’s first two grievances. 
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request to be transferred to a medical facility “[f]rivolous.”  
App. 99.   
In total, between December 27, 2017 and March 30, 2018, 
Hardy filed no less than twelve grievances seeking medical 
care for his worsening condition, all of which were rejected on 
varying grounds.  A few months after the last rejection, 
Hardy’s fears came to pass and medical staff found it necessary 
to amputate more of his leg.   
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Based on these events, Hardy filed a complaint bringing 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, and state law against both the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections (DOC) and several Camp Hill 
medical professionals.4  Both sets of defendants moved for 
summary judgment on the ground that Hardy failed to appeal 
his rejected grievances and his suit was thus barred by the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, which requires inmates to 
exhaust “available” administrative remedies before 
challenging prison conditions in federal court, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a).5  Hardy conceded that, by failing to appeal the 
 
4 Pursuant to the 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented 
to proceed before a magistrate judge.  We therefore refer to the 
Magistrate Judge’s rulings as those of the District Court going 
forward.   
5 The medical defendants also moved, in the alternative, to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
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rejected grievances, he had not exhausted that step of Camp 
Hill’s grievance process, but argued his suit could still proceed 
because that step was not available to him.  Having determined 
an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the exhaustion 
issue, the District Court heard testimony from Hardy, from 
Camp Hill’s grievance coordinator, Tonya Heist, and from an 
officer with the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance and 
Appeals.   
After the hearing, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants, holding that because the entire 
grievance process was available to Hardy, his failure to appeal 
his rejected grievances rendered his claims unexhausted.  In so 
holding, the District Court properly recognized that, under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ross v. Blake, a prison grievance 
process is unavailable—and thus may be deemed exhausted—
in three circumstances: (1) when the remedy “operates as a 
simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently 
unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) when 
it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable 
of use”; and (3) “when prison administrators thwart inmates 
from taking advantage of a grievance process through 
machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”  136 S. Ct. 
1850, 1859–60 (2016).  But the District Court determined that 
none of these circumstances described Hardy’s experience 
with the Camp Hill grievance process.   
The Court based that determination on a number of factual 
findings.  Although it made no finding as to whether Hardy had 
 
Procedure 12(d), the District Court construed the medical 
defendants’ entire motion as one for summary judgment.    
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received a handbook, it found that “Hardy was clearly aware a 
grievance process existed.”  Hardy v. Shaikh, No. 1:18-CV-
1707, 2019 WL 1756535, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2019).  It 
also found that Hardy’s use of this process was not “thwart[ed] 
. . . through . . . misrepresentation.”  Id. at *3 (quoting Rinaldi 
v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2018)).  While the 
District Court credited Hardy’s testimony that his counselor 
instructed him to respond to a rejected grievance by “fill[ing] 
out another one and send[ing] it in,” it found that this advice 
did not misrepresent Hardy’s duty to appeal because, as a 
technical matter, Hardy could have submitted an appeal on the 
same form as an initial grievance by simply writing the word 
“appeal” somewhere on his submission.  Hardy, 2019 WL 
1756535, at *5 (quoting App. 187).  And because the District 
Court assumed that only a “clear misrepresentation” by prison 
staff could thwart an inmate’s use of a grievance process, it 
found that the prison’s counselor’s advice fell short of this 
standard and the process reviewed was “available” to Hardy.  
Hardy, 2019 WL 1756535, at *5, *7.  This appeal followed.   
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1343, and 1367(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over both the grant 
of summary judgment, Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 
207 n.16 (3d Cir. 2018), and the “determination of a failure to 
exhaust,” and we “accept the [District Court’s] factual 
conclusions unless clearly erroneous,”  Small v. Camden 
County, 728 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
The District Court’s holding that the grievance process was 
available to Hardy was premised on its assumption that only a 
“clear misrepresentation” by prison staff may thwart an 
inmate’s use of a grievance process.  We are therefore called 
on to clarify Ross’s third genre of unavailability: when does a 
“misrepresentation” render a grievance process unavailable?   
Below, we first consider whether the misrepresentation 
must be “clear” or whether a statement that is merely 
misleading or deceptive may suffice.  Second, we consider 
what showing is required to establish that an inmate’s use of 
the grievance process was thwarted by misrepresentation.  
Finally, we measure Hardy’s showing against that standard to 
determine if the grievance process here was available to him 
and, accordingly, whether his suit may proceed.   
A. The Meaning of the “Misrepresentation” Under 
Ross 
While the District Court assumed that only a “clear 
misrepresentation” by prison staff can render remedies 
unavailable, our precedent says otherwise.   
We have long recognized that misleading as well as clearly 
erroneous statements can render a grievance process 
unavailable, beginning with our 2002 decision in Brown v. 
Croak, 312 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2002).  There, we held that an 
inmate who failed to file a formal grievance had nonetheless 
sufficiently complied with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement 
because he had received “misleading” instructions from prison 
staff: “security officials told [him] to wait for the termination 
of [an internal] investigation before commencing a formal 
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claim” and then “never informed [him] that the investigation 
was completed.”  Id. at 112, 113.  Because it was technically 
correct that the inmate could have waited until after the 
resolution of the internal investigation to file a grievance, see 
id. at 111 (noting that the inmate “could have filed a grievance” 
regardless of the status of the internal investigation), these 
instructions did not clearly misrepresent the grievance process.  
Yet we found that Brown was “entitled to rely” on these 
“misleading” instructions and that by giving the inmate advice 
“at odds” with the grievance process (to wait until the 
investigation was concluded) and then omitting crucial 
information from him (whether the investigation had 
concluded), the prison staff so misled him that they thwarted 
his ability to pursue relief through the grievance process, 
rendering it unavailable.  Id. at 112. 
We most recently reiterated this legal standard in Rinaldi v. 
United States, where we characterized Brown as finding an 
inmate’s use of the grievance process thwarted when “he was 
given misleading filing instructions.”  904 F.3d at 267; see also 
Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153 
(3d Cir. 2016) (relying on Brown to define when a grievance 
process is unavailable); Small, 728 F.3d at 271 (same). 
  Our sister circuits, too, have uniformly found that 
instructions that are merely misleading but not necessarily 
clear misrepresentations can thwart an inmate’s use of a 
grievance process.  For example, in Davis v. Hernandez, the 
Fifth Circuit held that administrative remedies were 
unavailable to an inmate who was told that the prison’s 
grievance process involved only a single step when it in fact 
involved two, applying the rule that “[g]rievance procedures 
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are unavailable to an inmate if the correctional facility’s staff 
misled the inmate as to the existence or rules of the grievance 
process so as to cause the inmate to fail to exhaust such 
process.”  798 F.3d 290, 291, 295 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis 
omitted).  The Eighth Circuit too has explicitly held that 
misleading instructions by prison staff can thwart an inmate’s 
use of a grievance process, concluding that administrative 
remedies were not available to an inmate who was “misled” by 
a prison official’s advice to wait to file a formal grievance until 
the prisoner received a response to his informal complaint, 
when in fact the inmate was required to file an appeal without 
awaiting a response.  Townsend v. Murphy, 898 F.3d 780, 783–
84 (8th Cir. 2018).  And other circuits are in accord.6   
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly defined 
what qualifies as a “misrepresentation” that “thwart[s] inmates 
from taking advantage of a grievance process,” its reasoning in 
 
6 See, e.g., Swisher v. Porter Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 769 F.3d 
553, 555 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (citing Brown for the 
proposition that “[w]hen jail personnel mislead inmates about 
how to invoke the procedure the inmates can’t be blamed for 
failing to invoke it”); Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 906 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (relying on Brown to find that remedies are 
unavailable when “prison officials misle[a]d” a prisoner into 
thinking that “the remedy does not exist or inaccurately 
describe the steps he needs to take to pursue it”); Nunez v. 
Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a 
grievance process unavailable to an inmate “misled” about the 
steps of that process); cf. Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 312 
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding remedies unavailable to an inmate who 
relied on a prison official’s misleading advice).  
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Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1860, is consistent with the expansive 
definition adopted by the Courts of Appeals.  The critical test 
under Ross is not whether a misrepresentation is “clear” but 
whether that misrepresentation amounts to “interference with 
an inmate’s pursuit of relief [that] renders the administrative 
process unavailable.”  Id.  Thus, in explaining that a grievance 
process is unavailable “when prison administrators thwart 
inmates . . .  through . . . misrepresentation,” the Court looked 
to appellate court cases “address[ing] a variety of instances in 
which officials misled . . . individual inmates so as to prevent 
their use of otherwise proper procedures” and held that “such 
interference with an inmate’s pursuit of relief renders the 
administrative process unavailable.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
The Court also cited approvingly to the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in Davis v. Hernandez and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Pavey v. Conley, quoting language from both about prison staff 
“misleading” inmates.  Id. at 1860 n.3 (citing Davis, 798 F.3d 
at 295, and Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir 2011)).   
This approach is also consistent with the statutory purposes 
of the PLRA exhaustion requirement.  That requirement was 
intended to “return control of the inmate grievance process to 
prison administrators”; to “encourage development of an 
administrative record, and perhaps settlements, within the 
inmate grievance process”; and to “reduce the burden on the 
federal courts by erecting barriers to frivolous prisoner 
lawsuits.”  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2004).  
But those benefits cannot be realized unless the grievance 
process to be exhausted is actually available to inmates and 
faithfully followed by the prisons.  That is why we require 
prisons to “reasonably communicate[]” remedies to prisoners,  
Small, 728 F.3d at 271, and—recognizing that just as 
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“prisoners [must] comply with the procedural demands of a 
system created by their jailors[,]” “[n]o less must prisons 
comply with the demands of the system they created”—we 
require “strict compliance by prison officials with their own 
policies,” Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365, 367 (3d 
Cir. 2019).   
That is also why it is imperative that prisons refrain from 
not only clear misrepresentations, but also misleading 
statements.  If prisoners conclude they cannot trust prison staff 
to give them reliable advice and instructions about the 
grievance process, they “will be more likely either to bypass 
internal procedures entirely and file a complaint in federal 
court or use a federal lawsuit to prod prison officials into a 
response, thus taxing the judicial resources that Congress 
meant to conserve by passing the PLRA.”  Robinson, 831 F.3d 
at 155.  Accurate advice, in contrast, allows for “grievance 
systems that provide—and that are perceived by prisoners as 
providing—a meaningful opportunity for prisoners to raise 
meritorious grievances.”  Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 102 
(2006). 
In sum, based on both precedent and the purposes of the 
PLRA, it was error for the District Court to premise exhaustion 
on a “clear misrepresentation.”  Misleading or deceptive 
instructions from a prison official can also render a grievance 
process unavailable. 
B. The Showing Required to Establish Thwarting of the 
Grievance Process 
Having established that a misleading instruction may 
qualify as a “misrepresentation” under Ross, we now consider 
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what an inmate must show to establish that the 
misrepresentation “thwart[ed] [him] from taking advantage of 
a grievance process.”  136 S. Ct. at 1860.   
As we explained in Rinaldi, the burden to plead and prove 
that he was thwarted rests on the inmate: “once the defendant 
has established that the inmate failed to resort to administrative 
remedies, the onus falls on the inmate to show that such 
remedies were unavailable to him.”   904 F.3d at 268 (citation 
omitted).  But while the burden of proof may be clear, the 
showing required to meet it is not.  To date, no Court of 
Appeals has articulated a clear test for when an inmate has 
established that a grievance process is unavailable to him 
because a misrepresentation thwarted his use of that process.  
Here again, however, Rinaldi paves our way.  In that case, 
we fashioned a test to establish when another type of prison 
conduct identified in Ross—“intimidation”—so thwarted an 
inmate’s use of the grievance process as to render it 
“unavailable.”  Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268–69.  The inquiry, we 
explained, must include an objective and subjective 
component.  Id.  We described “[t]he objective component [as] 
of chief importance because it maintains the exhaustion 
requirement for the vast majority of claims and allows 
otherwise unexhausted claims to proceed only in the 
exceptional circumstance where the facts alleged would 
reasonably give rise to a substantial fear of serious harm.”  Id. 
at 268.  The subjective requirement, on the other hand, ensures 
that an inmate seeking to be relieved of the exhaustion 
requirement actually has been thwarted from using the 
grievance process.  Id. at 269.  Thus, we concluded, an inmate 
must show both “that the threat was sufficiently serious that it 
 17 
 
would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and 
fortitude from lodging a grievance” and “that the threat 
actually did deter this particular inmate.”  Id.   
These same considerations lead us to adopt an analogous 
two-part test for when an inmate’s use of a grievance process 
is thwarted by misrepresentation.  As an objective matter, 
taking account of the speaker and context, the instruction must 
be of the sort that a reasonable inmate would be “entitled to 
rely on,” even though it is “at odds with the wording” of the 
grievance process.  Brown, 312 F.3d at 112; see also Davis, 
798 F.3d at 296 (finding “no reason that [the inmate] should 
not be entitled to rely on the representations of his jailers”).  It 
also must be so misleading to a reasonable inmate as to 
interfere with his use of the grievance process.  Brown, 312 
F.3d at 113; see also Townsend, 898 F.3d at 783–84; Davis, 
798 F.3d at 296.  These requirements will ensure that 
“otherwise unexhausted claims . . . proceed only in . . . 
exceptional circumstance[s].”  Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268.   
As a subjective matter, the inmate must persuade the 
district court that he in fact did rely on the misrepresentation to 
his detriment.  As in the threat context, Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 
268–69, objectively misleading instructions can be 
circumstantial evidence that an inmate’s use of the grievance 
process has been thwarted, but a further showing—such as 
“documents, affidavits, or live testimony if deemed 
warranted,” id. at 269—will typically be required.  And in any 
event, that circumstantial evidence can be overcome by 
evidence that an inmate actually knew how to navigate the 
grievance process despite the misleading instructions.  Id.; cf. 
Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (“When a 
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prisoner has no means of verifying prison officials’ claims 
about the administrative grievance process, incorrect 
statements by officials may indeed make remedies 
unavailable.”).  
This test for assessing misrepresentations not only provides 
an administrable and consistent framework for the third 
category of “unavailability” under Ross:  It also promotes 
Congress’s goals in requiring exhaustion under the PLRA.7  If 
the objective prong is the stick, discouraging prison staff from 
misleading inmates about the grievance process, the subjective 
prong is the carrot, encouraging prisons to impart knowledge 
of their grievance process by “reasonably communicat[ing]” 
 
7Our focus here has been on the third category under Ross, 
namely, “when prison administrators thwart inmates from 
taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, 
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” 136 S.Ct. at 1860.  But we 
would not want, by our silence with respect to the 
first Ross factor, to suggest that the misleading comment from 
Hardy’s counselor was the only troubling aspect of the prison 
grievance process brought to light by this case.  It bears 
emphasizing that the first Ross category, which deems 
exhaustion satisfied when the remedy in question “operates as 
a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently 
unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates[,]” is 
aimed at preventing grievance procedures from becoming a 
needlessly difficult obstacle to inmates receiving needed 
relief.  Here, in the face of confusing and evolving grounds for 
rejection, Hardy repeatedly requested relief for a manifestly 
serious medical complaint.  To put it mildly, the present record 
does not reflect well on the prison’s handling of it.  
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grievance procedures to inmates.  Small, 728 F.3d at 271.  And 
the result will be to encourage resolution of disputes “within 
the inmate grievance process,” to weed out “frivolous prisoner 
lawsuits,” and ultimately to “reduce the burden [of such 
lawsuits] on the federal courts.”  Spruill, 372 F.3d at 230.   
C. Application to Hardy  
As we have established today, to defeat a failure-to-exhaust 
defense based on a misrepresentation by prison staff, an inmate 
must show (1) that the misrepresentation is one which a 
reasonable inmate would be entitled to rely on and sufficiently 
misleading to interfere with a reasonable inmate’s use of the 
grievance process, and (2) that the inmate was actually misled 
by the misrepresentation.  Applying that test here, Hardy has 
met his burden on both prongs.   
First, the prison counselor’s instruction that Hardy respond 
to his rejected grievances by “fill[ing] out another one and 
send[ing] it in,” App. 187, satisfies the objective prong.  It was 
made to him by his assigned counselor, the prison staff member 
to whom inmates were encouraged to make such inquiries and 
who was expected to have accurate information about the 
grievance process.  It was also sufficiently misleading to 
interfere with a reasonable inmate’s ability to navigate the 
grievance process.  In effect, the counselor advised—just as in 
Davis—that the grievance process contained only a single step 
when it in fact required more.  See 798 F.3d at 296 & n.2 
(finding the appeals step of a grievance process unavailable 
when  “there were [no] factual circumstances such that [the 
prisoner] reasonably should have known—despite the jail 
staff’s misrepresentation otherwise—that the grievance 
process had a second step” (emphasis omitted)).  And, while 
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not a “clear misrepresentation” because as the District Court 
noted, Hardy, 2019 WL 1756535, at *5, it was technically true 
that Hardy could have submitted an appeal on the same 
grievance form as his original grievance, it was a 
misrepresentation nonetheless for it omitted a key piece of 
information:  that Hardy was required to write the word 
“appeal” somewhere on the form.  See Brown, 312 F.3d at 111–
12 (finding prison staff’s instructions misleading not only 
because they told a prisoner to wait for an investigation to be 
completed before filing his grievance, but also because they 
withheld the critical information that this investigation had 
been completed.)    
Second, Hardy made the requisite showing under the 
subjective prong.  According to his testimony at the evidentiary 
hearing—credited by the District Court—he was “clearly 
aware a grievance process existed at Camp Hill,” App. 11, but 
he was unaware that this grievance process required him to file 
an appeal.  As Hardy explained in his testimony, he did not 
receive a handbook when he first entered Camp Hill because 
he spent his first week in the infirmary where he was not 
permitted personal belongings, and he only signed the 
acknowledgment that he received the handbook because he 
was told it would be left in his prison block.  As it turned out, 
it was not there; his subsequent requests for it went 
unanswered; and his attempts to go to the library, the only place 
he could read a copy of the grievance manual, were rebuffed—
twice.8  Accord Townsend, 898 F.3d at 783–84 (noting that a 
 
8 Even if Hardy had managed to get his hands on the 
grievance manual, this may only have added to his confusion:  
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misrepresentation was “magnified” because the prisoner was 
denied access to the library and thus had no way to “verify” the 
official’s misstatements).     
On the flip side, the defendants produced no evidence that 
Hardy was aware of the appeal requirement.  The defendants 
conceded at oral argument that they have no basis to dispute 
Hardy’s representation that Camp Hill does not permit inmates 
to have personal belongings in the infirmary and that Hardy did 
not receive the handbook when admitted.  So unable to impute 
knowledge based on Hardy’s access to the handbook or the 
grievance manual, defendants instead argue that Hardy should 
have known of the appeals requirement because he received 
rejections and because he had a duty “to take affirmative action 
to ascertain his rights and responsibilities under the grievance 
policy” by consulting other inmates and prison staff.  Gov’t 
Defs.’ Br. 17.   
Whether viewed as relevant to the objective or subjective 
prongs, these arguments only lend further support to Hardy.9  
 
The manual states that rejected grievances must be appealed, 
but also allows for rejected grievances to be resubmitted.   
9 As presented, these arguments seem to pertain to the 
objective, not the subjective, prong.  There are of course cases 
where it is so obvious what a reasonable person “should have 
known” as to support the inference of actual knowledge, i.e., 
that this party must have known.  See Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 
F.3d 424, 440, 441–42 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 
536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)).  The defendants, however, do not 
articulate that argument.  Instead, they appear to be arguing 
only as an objective matter that a reasonable inmate should 
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The grievance rejections provided an array of explanations, 
none of which was the failure to appeal, and they included no 
information or instruction about the next step an inmate should 
take; indeed, they did not even mention the word “appeal.”  In 
addition, Hardy did take “affirmative action to ascertain his 
rights”: he asked his counselor, who misled him.  It is no 
answer—where a prison has refused to provide an inmate with 
access to written information about the grievance process, 
provided no guidance in its rejections, and affirmatively misled 
the inmate—that the inmate should have sought advice from 
fellow prisoners.  We will not “allow[] jails and prisons to 
play hide-and-seek with administrative remedies” in this 
manner, “keep[ing] all remedies under wraps until after a 
lawsuit is filed and then uncover[ing] them and proclaim[ing] 
that the remedies were available all along.”  Goebert v. Lee 
County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007). 
In short, the prison had the duty in the first instance to 
“reasonably communicate[]” its policies to Hardy.  Small, 728 
F.3d at 271.  Instead, it provided misleading instructions on 
which a reasonable inmate would rely and on which the 
undisputed record shows Hardy did rely to his detriment.  All 
“available” remedies were exhausted.   
 
have divined the appeals requirement from the rejections or 
from discussions with other inmates and thus would not have 
been misled.  These arguments do not support an inference of 
actual knowledge on this record nor, for the reasons we 





For these reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s entry 
of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
